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Abbreviations and Acronyms
IOT Internet Of Things
MitM Man-in-the-Middle attack
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
CA Certificate Authority
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TLS Transport Layer Security
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
UTXO Unspent Transaction Outputs Cache
DoS Denial of Service
DNS Domain Name System
DHT Distributed Hash Table
DL Discrete Logarithm
EC Elliptic Curve
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
RAM Random Access Memory
IHV Initial Hash Value
TSA Time Stamping Authority
GUI Graphical User Interface
SegWit Segregated Witness
ODF Open Data Format
OMI Open Messaging Interface
API Application Programming Interface
XML eXtensible Markup Language
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
REST Representational State Transfer
DOM Document Object Model
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to explore if Blockstack’s distributed DNS and
PKI can be used to share IOT node addresses and data without a central au-
thority in a trustless manner. Blockstack is a distributed DNS and PKI that
is build on top of Bitcoin’s blockchain. The underlying blockchain provides
the trustless environment.
Three goals are to be tested:
• Finding nodes. The Blockstack’s DNS is used to find the IOT node
addresses based on a unique identifier known to the user in a verifiable
way.
• Verify node data. The data shared by the nodes should be linked
by public key cryptography to the unique identifier found from Block-
stack’s DNS. User can verify that the data shared by the IOT node is
published by the owner of the unique identifier.
• Trustless environment. The trustless feature of the blockchain is
shared by the finding of nodes and data verification. Users don’t need
to rely on any central authority.
Finding IOT node addresses
IOT nodes have a address which can be found from Blockstack’s DNS using
a unique identifier. This address is cryptographically linked to the unique
identifier, thus the searcher can always verify that the address is provided by
the owner of the unique identifier. The unique identifier has been provided
to the searcher by the owner of the id in verifiable way, as in person.
8
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Verifying node data
The nodes will also have generated their own public and private key combo
and the public key will be shared through Blockstack’s DNS together with
the node address. Data will be signed with the nodes private key and this
way the validity of the data can be checked against the shared public key.
Trustless environment
Conventional systems like DNS and SSL rely on trusting some counter-party.
In DNS most of the trust relies on the root DNS servers. In addition to trust
there are reliability issues: the root servers are an easy target for denial of
service (DOS) attacks. SSL hierarchy of trust also has the same issues with
trust and reliability. Users need to trust the central authority (CA) to verify
sites and to remain neutral while doing so. Central authorities are single
points of failure, which are attractive targets for hackers.
Instead the Blockstack’s DNS and PKI system runs on top of Bitcoin’s
blockchain, which makes the DNS and PKI system as secure as the underlying
blockchain. Bitcoin’s blockchain represents a public ledger, which can not be
modified maliciously without controlling a majority of the computing power
in the network.
In this thesis I will explore if it is possible to extend this trustless feature
to the data shared by IOT Nodes.
Thesis Structure
The next chapter Background will go through some basic background in-
formation needed to understand how this trustless feature emerges from
blockchains. Next in Setup I will briefly introduce the programs and en-
vironment needed to develop and run the implementation. In Methods the
plan is explained in a higher level before going through it in more detail in
Implementation. Evaluation discusses how the plan worked and explores pos-
sible encountered problems. Chapter Conclusions concludes the thesis with
final remarks.
Chapter 2
Background
To understand how trust works in a distributed DNS system like Blockstack
we need to explain some of the fundamentals of Bitcoin and cryptography.
We start by looking at the original paper by Satoshi Nakamato which in-
troduced the electronic currency Bitcoin. After that the fundamentals of
public key cryptography are explored, including hashing and digital signa-
tures. Then the concepts of time-stamping, hashing and proof-of-work are
linked together to form the basis of the distributed system behind Bitcoin
that provides the trustless environment. Next some of the technical details of
transactions are explained more closely, as the Blockstack implementation is
build on top of them. Last the Blockstack architecture with the virtualchain
is explained. This finally shows how the trustless blockchain network enables
the distributed DNS to have the same trustless feature embedded in it.
Bitcoin and Blockchain
Bitcoin was introduced by a pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto in the paper
”Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” in 2008. In the paper
Nakamoto criticizes the current electronic payment systems that rely heavily
on trusted third parties. Mediation costs increase the transaction costs and
limit the minimum transaction size, making small payments an impossibility.
The possibility of reversals also increase the amount of information merchants
need from customers to be able to trust them. The costs and uncertainties
can be avoided by using physical currency, but before Bitcoin there was no
way to make payments over the Internet without a trusted third party. [17]
Previous electronic payment systems also have the problem of double
spend.
10
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doublespend
The coins used in a electronic payment system are usually in some way
copyable, which leads to the problem, that when you receive a coin, you can
not be certain that the same coin has not been used in a previous transaction.
As a solution to the double spend problem, the issuer of the coin has usually
had to have a database listing all of the transactions, to make sure that no
coin has been spent multiple times. This solution leads to a new problem.
The entire money system now depends on the company issuing the money
and all transactions need to go through them, just like with a bank. [17]
Nakamoto introduces a solution to these problems, that bases on cryp-
tographic proof, instead of trust. A electronic payment system that enables
transactions between parties, without a trusted third party. The technol-
ogy behind this electronic payment system (Bitcoin) is called the blockchain,
which ingeniously combines some well known cryptographic methods, such
as private and public key cryptography and hashing. In the next chapters I
will go through the building blocks of blockchain. To understand the inner
workings of Bitcoin and blockchain we should first start by looking in to
public key cryptography.
Public Key Crypthography
Bitcoin and blockchain rely heavily on public key cryptography to work, so
in this chapter we look more closely in to public key cryptography.
Cryptography is a method to communicate securely in the presence of an
attacker who can listen in or control the communication channel. Symmetric
cryptography is concerned with encryption: how to scramble a message so
that only the receiver is able to decipher it. Kerckhoffs’s Principle states
that the encryption key should be kept private, but the algorithm should be
public. This way the algorithm can be publicly tested against vulnerabilities
the original designer might have not thought of. [16]
Public key cryptography was developed, because of a key vulnerability in
symmetric encryption: key distribution. When two people are communicat-
ing with symmetric encryption, they need to share the same encryption key
beforehand through a secure channel. This is not always possible. [16]
If two participants (Alice and Bob) want to communicate using pub-
lic key cryptography, they start by generating a public-private keypair for
themselves. Public-private keys are mathematically linked in a way that if
a message is encrypted using one of them, it can only be opened by using
the other key. For Alice and Bob to communicate, they can send messages
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by encrypting them with the other ones public key. Now only the owner
of the public key has the corresponding private key to open the encryption
and thus read the message. This however still leaves the problem of how to
communicate the public keys to each other and opens the possibility for a
Man-in-the-Middle attack (MitM). [16]
The Man-in-the-Middle attack is an attack where the attacker intercepts
messages between participants on an insecure channel. The attacker inter-
cepts the public key sent by Alice to Bob and instead sends his own key. The
attacker can now eavesdrop on the messages or even alter them, without the
participants ever knowing. There is a couple of ways to handle the MitM
attack. [16]
• The participants could share their public keys by another, more secure
channel, like in person, but this is again a similar problem as with key
distribution. However this public key distribution problem is easier,
as it only needs authentication, not authentication and privacy.
• Web of trust. A method used in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and
GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). Users sign the public keys of other users
they know and trust. Public keys are kept in a keyring. If the user
needs to send a message to someone he does not know (public key not
in keyring), the user can request the public key from someone he trusts
(public key in keyring) to sign and send it.
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Traditional PKI assumes a cen-
tral authority called the Certificate Authority (CA). Everyone has
the public key of the CA and trusts it. User shares his public key with
the CA and the CA checks the users identity and then signs the public
key. Now when the user wants to communicate with someone else, he
sends the CA signed public key. The other user can now check that
the public key is properly signed by the CA, i.e. that the certificate is
valid. This is essentially how Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) work. SSL and TLS are the most widely
used protocols for secure communication on the internet.
[16]
A concept that is closely related to public key cryptography is digital
signatures. In Bitcoin and blockchain the transactions are signed to prove
they are made by the owner of the funds that are being transferred. In the
next section we will go through how digital signatures work.
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Digital Signatures
The goal of digital signatures is to ensure that the message was generated by
the signer, has not been tampered and to make sure that the signer is not
able to deny having signed it. As digital signatures are signed with a private
key, which is linked to a public key, the signature can always be proven to
have come from the owner of the public key. In comparison, when using
symmetric algorithms, proving that the message came from the sender is not
possible, as both the sender and receiver share the same key used in the
encryption. [16]
In the Bitcoin protocol, digital signatures are used to sign transactions. A
bitcoin address is a public key and if the owner wants to make a transaction
he needs to sign the transaction with the corresponding private key. The
messages signed with digital signatures can be of an arbitrary length. Public
key cryptography algorithms are quite slow, so long messages would take a
long time to process. Because of this, hashes are usually signed, instead of the
whole message. Hash function is a algorithm that takes arbitrary length
data as input and outputs a fixed length bit-string, called the hash value.
Hash functions produce outputs that are always the same for the same input,
but small changes in the input produce big changes in the output. [16] Hashes
are explained more closely later when discussing the concept of proof-of-work
in Bitcoin and blockchain.
Digital signature protocol is a combination of a public-key algorithm and
digital signature scheme.
Main public key families used:
• Integer factorization. Based on factoring large integers. For example
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman). [18]
• Discrete logarithm (DL). Based on the difficulty of the discrete
logarithm problem on finite cyclic groups. [15]
• Elliptic curve (EC). Based on hard task of computing the generalized
logarithm problem on an elliptic curve.
[16]
Main digital signature schemes.
• RSA. RSA signature scheme is based on the RSA algorithm. Most
widely used digital signature scheme.
• Schnorr signature. Simplest scheme that can be used with both
discrete logarithm and elliptic curve algorithms. Small computational
times for signing and verification and smaller signatures.
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• Elgamal signature. Works for both the discrete logarithm and el-
liptic curve algorithms. Not widely used in practice as it needs more
computation and the signature is bigger than in other schemes like
Schnorr or DSA.
• Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). Widely used. Patent covering
it was made worldwide royalty-free.
[16]
Bitcoin protocol uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) with the DSA
signature scheme. When RSA [18] is based on factoring large integers, ECC
is instead based on an elliptic curve consisting of large set of successive points.
Private and public keys are points on this curve. [16]
The next chapter discusses how Bitcoin addresses are constructed from
these ECC public keys.
Bitcoin addresses
A Bitcoin address is a hash of the ECC public key. OpenSSL is used to
perform elliptic curve cryptography. 65 bytes are used in OpenSSL to repre-
sent a elliptic curve. First byte is used to store the type of the point: 0x04
uncompressed and 0x02 or 0x03 for compressed. If the omitted coordinate
(y-coordinate) was even, then 0x02 and if it was odd, 0x03 is used. After the
first byte, in the uncompressed representation comes the x and y coordinates
and in compressed representation, only the x coordinate. Bitcoin uses 256
bit elliptic curves, so each coordinate takes 256 bits = 32 bytes of space.
Uncompressed point then takes a total of 65 bytes (1 for the type and 32x 2
for the coordinates). Next the OpenSSL representation of the elliptic curve
point is hashed using SHA256 and the RIPEMD160. SHA256 produces a
hash of 256 bits = 32 bytes. RIPEMD160 produces a hash of 160 bits = 20
bytes. This second hashing was chosen by Satoshi to reduce the size of the
address, thus making transactions smaller.
For preventing typing errors, a checksum is also calculated from the hash.
The 20 byte RIPEMD160 hash is run through a SHA2562 and again through
a RIPEMD160 hash and then the first 4 bytes are kept as a checksum. The
byte string starts with a byte indicating the type of the address, next the
20 bytes resulted from the RIPEMD160 hash and last the 4 byte checksum.
The type of the address can be:
• 0s (decimal) for a public key address. The encoded address would
start with 1.
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• 5s (decimal) for a script address. The encoded address will start
with a 3.
• 111s (decimal) for a testnet public key. Encoded address starts with
an m or n.
• 196s (decimal) for testnet script address. Encoded address starts with
2.
In the last step the byte string is encoded with Base58, resulting in a Bitcoin
address that is 27 to 34 characters long, having characters A-Z, a-z, 0-9,
excluding 0,O,I and l. [16]
Bitcoin transactions are made to and from these addresses. Next we will
go through how transactions work.
Transactions
Bitcoins are not stored in users computers, but instead they are entries in a
distributed database, called the blockchain. The blockchain does not store
accounts and balances, but transactions. Transactions are a combination of
a list of transaction inputs (TxIn) and a list of transaction outputs
(TxOut). Each transaction ouput has an amount and the recipient address.
Transaction input has a reference to a previous transaction output and a
signature that proves that the funds in the previous transaction output can
be spent. The signature must be signed by the private key linked to the public
key in the bitcoin address. If the signature does not match, the network will
drop the invalid transaction. A transaction holds several TxIns and TxOuts
and distributes funds from input to outputs. The outputs must be unspent
or the transaction is invalid. For the transaction to be valid, the sum of
inputs must be greater than or equal to the sum of outputs. The difference
between inputs and outputs is called the transaction fee and it is payed to
the miner of the block that holds the transaction. Outputs in the blockchain
can only be spent once and they must be spent fully. If the sender does
not want to pay all of the remainder as a transaction fee, he can include a
change address as an additional output to the transaction. The origin of
funds can be used, but to increase privacy, it is recommended to create a
new address after every transaction. [16]
When a transaction is sent to the network, the first node receiving the
transaction will check if it is valid and then passes it on to other nodes. Steps
to check validity:
• Check that the previous outputs exist and have not been spent.
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• Check that the sum of inputs is greater than or equal to the sum of
outputs. Difference left as payment for the miner.
• Check the signature validity for each of the inputs.
[16]
To make the checking of outputs faster, Satoshi forced that the output
should be spent fully. This enables bitcoin to have a unspent transaction
outputs cache(UTXO), which makes checking outputs faster. All of the
transactions inputs should be listed in the UTXO and if some are missing,
the transaction is invalid and can be discarded. UTXO uses a lot less disk
space than the whole blockchain and this allows nodes to keep it in RAM,
making transaction checking faster. [16]
Transaction outputs can be more than just a bitcoin address. This will
be explored in the next chapter with transaction scripts.
Transaction scripts and types of transactions
The Bitcoin protocol allows the transaction output to be more than just
a bitcoin address. Transaction output creates a mathematical puzzle that
must be solved in order to spent the output. Script that creates the puzzle
is called <scriptPubKey> and the script that unlocks the funds is called
<scriptSig>. A node that is checking the validity of a transaction, con-
catenates the <scriptPubkey> with <scriptSig> and if the final result is
true, the transaction is deemed valid. The scripting language is stack-based.
Commands called opcodes place data on the stack, or operate on the data
in the stack. Operations can only work on the data that is at the top of
the stack. The scripting language is not Turing-complete to avoid certain
attacks on the network. With a Turing-complete language, an attacker could
create <scriptPubKey> that never finishes, thus stalling the nodes running
the script and possibly crash the whole network. [16] Some alternatives to
Bitcoin, such as Ethereum implement a full Turing-complete transaction sys-
tem [8].
There are several different types of transactions.
Pay-to-address is the most common type of transaction. In it the previ-
ous transactions TxOut has a <scriptPubKey> with the following commands
in order:
• OP DUP
• OP HASH160
• <hashPubKeyHex>
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• OP EQUALVERIFY
• OP CHECKSIG
And the current transactions TxIn has a <scriptSig> with:
• <sig>
• <pubKey>
A example execution of the commands and data are shown in table 2.1.
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Stack Command
<sig>
<pubKey>
<sig> OP DUP
<pubKey>
<sig> OP HASH160
<pubKey>
<pubKey>
<sig> <hashPubKeyHex>
<pubKey>
<pubKeyHash>
<sig> OP EQUALVERIFY
<pubKey>
<pubKeyHash>
<hashPbKeyHex>
<sig> OP CHECKSIG
<pubKey>
1
Table 2.1: Bitcoin Pay-to-address transaction
The stack is LIFO (last in first out), so the data and and commands that
are pushed first to the stack, are used last [16]. There are several different
transaction types defined in Bitcoin, which are listed in the next chapter.
6.7 Standard Transactions
Bitcoin defines six transaction types:
• TX PUBKEY, pay-to-public-key. The <scriptPubKey> for this is
[OP PUBKEY OP CHECKSIG].
• TX PUBKEYHASH, pay-to-address. The<scriptPubKey> is [OP DUP
OP HASH160 OP PUBKEYHASH OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG].
• TX SCRIPTHASH, pay-to-script-hash (P2SH). The<scriptPubKey>
is [OP HASH160 <20-byte-hash> OP EQUAL].
• TX MULTISIG, multisignature transaction. The <scriptPubKey>
is [m sig1 ... sign n OP CHECKMULTISIG].
• TX NULL DATA, also known as OP RETURN transactions. The
<scriptPubKey> is [OP RETURN <data>].
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• TX NONSTANDARD if it is anything else.
The first five are called the standard transactions as they are the only
transactions forwarded or mined by nodes implementing the reference Bit-
coin software. Non-standard transaction can only be included by a miner
of a block [16]. For the purpose of this thesis, the OP RETURN or
TX NULL DATA is especially interesting, as it is used by the Blockstack
implementation to create the distributed DNS. This will be explored later on
when discussing Blockstack’s architecture.
When the transactions are linked together one after another, they form
the actual blockchain. In the next chapter we will look more closely to the
building blocks of the blockchain: hash functions, time-stamps and proof-of-
work.
The blockchain
The blockchain secures the distributed network with proof-of-work. Com-
putational power is needed to do the proof-of-work and thus create the trans-
actions blocks. For an attacker to successfully change a transaction in a
block, he would need to have enough computing power to do the proof-of-
work for the block that has the transaction, for all the blocks that has been
created after that, and keep adding blocks faster than the rest of the network
combined[16].
Next we will look in to some of the technologies behind the blockchain
that makes this kind of an protection possible.
Hash functions
Transaction blocks are linked together by their hashes. Lets look more closely
how a hash function works.
Hash function is an algorithm that takes arbitrary length data as input
and outputs a fixed length bit-string, called the hash value. Hash functions
produce outputs that are always the same for the same inputs, but small
changes in the input produce big changes in the output. Hash function
should distribute input values to hash values proportionally, so that every
hash value maps to roughly same number of input values. [16]
Proof-of-work in Bitcoin uses cryptographic hash functions. These
cryptographic hash functions have a few extra requirements:
• One-wayness. It is computationally infeasible to find the input value
from the hash value.
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• Weak collision resistance. It is computationally infeasible to find
another input with the same hash value.
• Strong collision resistance. It is computationally infeasible to find
two inputs that result in the same hash value.
Bitcoin uses SHA2562 (SHA256 two times) for its proof-of-work function.
SHA256 fulfills the one-wayness requirement. There is no known algorithm
that can recover the message in polynomial time compared to the size of the
message. In practice, the only way to break the hash, is to brute-force it, and
this takes exponential time. [16] This feature is used in the proof-of-work,
which we will go through later.
SHA256 uses the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction as a compression
function. The compression function outputs same length messages as the
input, but the bits are scrambled in a deterministic, but complicated way.
The message is first broken to blocks of 256 bits. The end of the message is
padded with zeros and the length of the message. Now the 256 bit blocks
are ran through the compression function, which takes in a Initial Hash
Value(IHV) and the message which is in our case is one of the 256 bit blocks.
The IHV is always the previous blocks hash and the result of the last blocks
compression is the SHA256 hash value of the whole message [16]. With
SHA2562 the results of the first SHA256 are ran through again and the end
result is SHA2562 which is used in Bitcoin.
In the context of the blockchain, hashing is used to calculate a hash of
the whole block of transactions, with a few additions that enable it to have
the features of linking blocks and proof-of-work. Before explaining proof-of-
work in more details, lets first look in to how time-stamping works in the
blockchain.
7.2 Time-stamp
Digital time-stamps are used to prove that some information existed at a
particular time. Usually a hash of the data is used in the digital time-
stamp, instead of the whole data. This is more secure (data and time-
stamping medium can be kept separate) and uses less space (hash is usually
smaller). [16]
One way to secure a digital time-stamp would be to sent a trusted party
a copy of the information, which would be stored together with the time of
reception. The trusted party could however lose the database or get compro-
mised. One could also use a Time-stamping authority (TSA) to sign the
data and time-stamp with TSA’s own private key and then store the signa-
ture themselves. This however relies on trusting the TSA to be honest. [16]
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A third way to secure a digital time-stamp would be to publish the hash
in a public place. This could be, for example, a newspaper. An attacker
would need to crack the published hash, or subvert all the newspapers with
the published hash. TSA could use this to publish a hash of the signature
of a time-stamp. However, publishing every time-stamp separately would be
costly. The costs could be brought down by combining the hashes of multiple
time-stamps before publishing. Multiple hashes of data to be time-stamped
can be combined with Merkle trees. [16]
To make the digital time-stamps even more secure, linked time-stamps
can be used. The next data hash to be published would be linked to the
previously published hash. Now an attacker needs to crack two hashes to be
able to make changes. Linking every hash to a previous one, makes cracking
exponentially harder, as more links are added. [16]
A TSA would work by first collecting data from clients to be time-stamped
for some time period. When the period is over, the collected data is hashed
together using a Merkle tree, the resulting hash is hashed together with the
final hash of the previous time period and then the final hash would be
published. This scheme could be used to secure transactions in a digital
currency, but it would rely on trusting the central counter party running the
TSA and would also need some kind of an public medium to publish the
hashes. In Bitcoin, proof-of-work is the last addition to this scheme, that
allows a distributed system without the need for trust. [16]
Lets next explain what is proof-of-work and how it relates to hashes.
Proof-of-work
Digital services are subject to several kinds of attacks, such as denial of
service (DoS). One defense against attacks is to require clients to prove that
some kind of work has been done (Proof-of-work). The proof-of-work could
be for example some problem needing user input, like CAPTCHA, but in
Bitcoins case, a computationally-hard problem is used. The problem should
be hard to solve, but easy (fast) to verify. Proof-of-work systems can follow
two different protocols:
• Challenge-Response. Client requests access to a service and the
service poses a proof-of-work challenge to the client. Server grants
access to the client only if the challenge has been solved correctly. This
is for example the model used with CAPTCHA.
• Solution-Verification. This is a asynchronous protocol in which on-
going communication between client and server is not needed. Solu-
tion and verification can be done at different times. Client creates a
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 22
proof-of-work problem according to a predetermined and agreed upon
algorithm and then solves it. Then the client sends the solution to the
server for verification.
Bitcoin requires proof-of-work to be performed on transaction blocks be-
fore they can be added to the blockchain. Partial hash inversion is used
as the proof-of-work function. A hash of a block of transactions must match
a pattern in which the hash starts with a certain number of 0 bits. This is
called hash inversion as the proof-of-work has to invert a certain pattern in
part of the hash. To solve the partial hash such a nonce has to be found that
when applied to the message the resulting hash will start with the required
amount of 0 bits. It is computationally costly to solve the partial hash,
as many nonces have to be tried before finding the solution. It is however
easy to verify as only one hash calculation is needed. The difficulty of the
problem can easily be adjusted by changing the required amount of 0 bits.
Bitcoin borrowed the idea of partial hash inversion from Hashcash that was
introduced by Adam Back in 1997 [13]. [16]
Clients that are doing this proof-of-work are called miners. Miners use
electricity to compete on finding the next proof-of-work hash. To encourage
this behaviour, miner of a block receives bitcoins which consists of a block
reward and transaction fees. The block reward is the mechanism by which
new bitcoins are created. It started as 50BTC and is halved roughly every
4 years. Currently the reward is 12,5BTC and the bitcoin supply grows
asymptotically approaching 21 million, but never reaching it exactly. The 21
million cap is going to be reached in practice around year 2140. [2]
Next lets summarize the blockchain technology before introducing the
Blockstack’s distributed DNS and PKI.
Blockchain summary
Blockchain technology was invented with the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. It
consists of a network of nodes running the Bitcoin software using electricity
to compete on finding transaction blocks and receiving block rewards and
transaction fees. This competition based on cryptographic proof-of-work
creates the trustless environment for the blockchain. This means that the
only thing the participants have to trust, are the algorithms behind Bitcoin,
which can only be changed by the majority vote of the network (hard forks).
No third party is needed to verify the transactions or handle the ledger.
The blockchain provides a immalleable public ledger that has the full his-
tory of transactions recorded. It consists of blocks of transactions linked by
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previous blocks hashes, creating a chain of blocks, blockchain. Units of cur-
rency are stored as transactions instead of amounts in accounts. Transaction
addresses are ECC public keys and transactions are made by using public
key cryptography to sign the transactions. Miners collect the transactions
to blocks and try to solve the problem of partial hash inversion to create the
next block in the chain and receive the rewards.
While the Bitcoin blockchain is currently mostly used only as a store of
value, the trustless environment and public ledger enable a variety of apps
to be built on top of it. Blockstack is one of these apps, which works as
a distributed DNS and PKI. The next chapter will go through Blockstack’s
architecture and technology and how we can use it with the IOT nodes.
Blockstack
Blockstack is the technology used to create a distributed DNS and PKI on
top of the Bitcoin’s blockchain. In this chapter we will first go through
Blockstack’s history and the reasons for building it, and then take a look at
the architecture behind the technology.
Blockstack’s history
Before Blockstack was created to run on top of another blockchain, it ran
on it’s own blockchain called the Namecoin. It had over 33 000 registered
entries and 200 000 transactions, before migrating to Bitcoins blockchain as
Blockstack. [12]
Running the Namecoin blockchain revealed a number of security and re-
liability concerns. A single miner was able to control over 51% of the min-
ing power, thus having the power to launch a successful 51% attack on the
network. There were also some problems related to broadcasting transac-
tions reliably over the network. Reliability of the network depends on how
actively a blockchain network is used and thus on how much financial incen-
tives there are to add more computing power. For security and reliability
reasons blockchain-based services should use the largest and most secure
blockchain, which at the moment is the Bitcoin blockchain. The most used
blockchain also usually has the most active code base, thus making bug fix-
ing faster. Introducing new features to old blockchains is hard, as they are
usually consensus-breaking and starting new blockchains is less secure. That
is why Namecoin migrated to Blockstack to overcome these tradeoffs with a
virtualchain build on top of another (currently Bitcoin) blockchain. While
working with Namecoin, the developers learned five lessons:
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1. There is a tradeoff between blockchain security and introducing new
functionality to blockchains.
2. There is a big difference in network reliability between the current
largest blockchain network (Bitcoin) and the alternate blockchains.
3. Selfish-mining like behavior can emerge by itself in blockchains.
4. Consensus-breaking changes are fundamentally hard. They are not just
engineering problems, but also involve the incentive structures of the
parties involved.
5. At the current stage of blockchains, there are not enough computing
cycles dedicated to support multiple secure blockchains.
[12]
Security relies on the network’s combined computing power. Introduc-
ing new features to a blockchain might need a consensus breaking change,
which risks splitting the network on a hard fork, thus reducing the amount
of computing power each branch then has. New features also risk introduc-
ing new bugs to the code, which also limits what gets added. Security and
new features are therefore in conflict, because of the risk of hard forks and
bugs. [12]
There are also some technical limitations why using a virtualchain is
better than just the blockchain. The next chapter explores these limitations.
Blockchain limitations
Blockchains provide cryptographically auditable append only ledgers. They
have no central points of trust or failure and it enables a new class of decen-
tralized applications, where users do not need to put their trust in a single
party, like with for example DNS root servers or the root certificate author-
ity. However building a distributed DNS and PKI with just a blockchain has
some technical limitations:
• Space. Individual blockchains records hold data in the order of kilo-
bytes only. [17]
• Latency. Speed of creating and updating records is capped by the
blockchains write propagation and it is typically in the order of 10-40
minutes. [14]
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• Amount of operations. Total new operations in each round are
limited by the average bandwidth of nodes participating in the network.
Currently at around 1400 new operations per block. [6]
• Bootstrap time. New nodes need to independently audit the global
log from beginning. Time to bootstrap new nodes increases linearly
with time.
Using a virtualchain helps to overcome these limitations and to create a
system that binds human readable names to arbitrary values. The underlying
blockchain provides consensus on the global state of the naming system and
provides an append-only global log for changes. Writes to name-value pairs
can only be announced in new blocks. The global log is logically centralized
(all nodes see the same state) and organizationally decentralized (no central
party control the log). The virtualchain is used to overcome the problems
with space, latency, operation count and bootstrap time. [12]
The next section explores the Blockstack architecture to explain how the
virtualchain solves these problems.
Blockstack Architecture
Blockstack enables users to register unique human-readable usernames and
addresses, and associate public-keys, like PGP, along with additional data.
Blockstack does this by using the Bitcoin blockchain and by separating the
control and data planes: only minimal metadata (data hashes and state tran-
sitions) are kept in the blockchain and external datastores are used for bulk
storage. New functionality is introduced to production blockchains without
consensus-breaking changes with the use of a logically separate layer, virtu-
alchain. [12]
Some challenges with blockchains:
• Limits on data storage. Individual blockchain records can only hold
data in the order of kilobytes. Also the full blockchain keeps increasing
in size and is currently over 100GB in size.
• Slow writes. Transaction processing rate is capped by write propa-
gation. New blocks are announced every 10 minutes and a transaction
might take something between a couple of minutes to a few hours to
be accepted.
• Limited bandwidth. Number of transactions per block is limited by
the block size of the blockchain. Block size is usually limited by the
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average uplink bandwidth of nodes. For bitcoin this is about 1MB per
block ( 1000 transactions).
• Endless ledger. New nodes take a considerable time to boot up, as
they need to verify every block from the start.
[12]
Blockstack constructs the naming system as a separate layer on top of
the underlying blockchain. The underlying blockchain is used to achieve
consensus on the state of the naming system and to bind names to data
records. The blockchain is used as a communication channel to announce
state changes and provide total ordering for all operations supported by the
naming system, like name registrations, updates and transfers. [12]
Blockstack separates the control and data plane. The control plane de-
fines the protocol for registering human-readable names, creating (name,hash)
bindings and creating bindings to owned cryptographic keypairs. The con-
trol plane is the blockchain and a logically separate layer on top, called a
virtualchain. The data plane handles the data storage and availability. It
consists of zone files for discovering data by hash or URL, and external stor-
age systems for storing the actual data. Name owners sign data values with
their private keys. Clients read data values from the data plane and verify
that either the data’s hash is in the zone file, or that the data includes a
signature with the name owner’s public key. [12]
The design of Blockstack allows it to run on top of any blockchain and it
is able to migrate to a new blockchain if the current one becomes compro-
mised. The security and reliability of Blockstack is directly related to the
underlying blockchain. Blockstacks virtualchain concept allows it to create
arbitrary state machines after processing information from the underlying
blockchain. A virtualchain treats transactions from the blockchain as inputs
to the state machine and valid inputs trigger state changes. This method
allows the introduction of new state machines without consensus-breaking
changes to the blockchain. Currently Blockstack introduces a state machine
that represents the global state of a naming system. It is possible to construct
other state machines using the same method. [12]
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name-value pairs. All stored data is signed by the key of the owner of the
name. Storing data values outside of the blockchain results in no size limit
to data and allows multiple storage backends. Users don’t need to trust the
storage layer as the integrity of the data can be verified from the control
plane. Two different storage modes are allowed: mutable and immutable.
In mutable storage the user’s zone file contains a URI record that points to
the data that includes a signature of the user. Changing the data involves
signing the data again, but there is no need to update the zone file and
make blockchain transactions. This is thus as fast as changing the data and
signing it. Immutable storage is otherwise similar to mutable storage, but a
additional TXT record is added to the zone file which contains hash(data).
Changing immutable data requires a update to the zone file, which then
requires a new transaction in the blockchain. This is a lot slower and should
only be used for data that does not change often and for which it is important
that the readers always see the most up to date data. [12]
Blockstack summary
Blockstack is a distributed DNS and PKI built on top of Bitcoins blockchain
using a virtualchain. It separates functionality in to four different layers:
blockchain, virtualchain, routing and storage layers. The virtualchain is
build on top the blockchain using the blockchains additional data field called
OP RETURN. Virtualchain rules and operations related to name registra-
tions are stored in this field using hashes and operation codes. This linking
brings the same trustlessness feature to the virtualchain as is in the under-
lying blockchain.
Blockstack was first built to use its own blockchain implementation called
NameCoin. This turned out be a bad idea, as the NameCoin blockchain had
very little computing power, which exposed it to 51% attacks. This is why
using the most popular (largest computing power) blockchain is preferred, as
Blockstack is only as secure as the underlying blockchain. Currently Block-
stack uses the Bitcoin blockchain.
Next a brief look in to the setup behind different parts of the implemen-
tation, before the discussing the actual methods and implementation.
Chapter 3
Setup
The test setup consists of four main parts: The Bitcoin’s blockchain, Block-
stack, the OMI-Node and a chrome extension called OmiViewer as a simple
GUI. Bitcoins blockchain will be used by Blockstack, which will be used to
register an unique id and to link the OMI-Node address and public key file
cryptographically to the id. These features will be used ”as is” without any
modification. Only development related to these parts will be the OMI-Node
address and public key file that will be linked in Blockstack’s zone file. The
actual development part is done on the OMI-Node’s message interface, by
adding hashing and signing of objects, and the OmiViewer is developed from
scratch to work as a simple proof of concept GUI to find OMI-Nodes linked
to Blockstack id’s and to verify the data published by OMI-Nodes.
Bitcoin and blockchain
The work is done using production Blockstack, which runs on the current
production Bitcoin blockchain network. At the time of writing the current
Bitcoin Core version is 0.14.2 [3]. Bitcoin also just activated a major update
called the Segregated Witness (SegWit) which among other things improved
block capacity and size, and fixed bugs [4]. The Bitcoin Core program is not
installed or used directly in this thesis, but Blockstack’s default Bitcoin node
is trusted and used for buying and using bitcoins for name registration and
updates. Even this trust step could be avoided by installing the Bitcoin-core
software and using a local copy instead of the default one run by Blockstack’s
development team.
To buy the Blockstack unique id address, bitcoins are needed. These were
bought using the Finnish service Bittiraha.fi [5].
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Blockstack
Blockstack will be installed on a Ubuntu 16.04 LTS operating system on a
laptop. Blockstack version 0.14.5.1 is installed from Blockstack’s github [7].
Specifically the blockstack-core program is installed following the github in-
structions. Blockstack-core is the main application used to control the linked
bitcoin wallet, to buy unique id’s and to update the zone file.
OMI-Node
The O-MI-Node developed at Aalto is modified to hash and sign response
messages [1]. The O-MI Node is a Internet of Things data server that uses
Open Messaging Interface (OMI) and Open Data Format (ODF). It is devel-
oped mostly in Java and Scala, and the necessary modifications done by me
to the response messages are done in Scala. The O-MI Node will be installed,
developed and used locally in the same laptop running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
OmiViewer chrome extension
The OmiViewer chrome extensions will be developed on the current version
of the Chrome browser, which at the moment of development is 58.0.3029.81
(64-bit). It will also be installed and developed locally on the same laptop
running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
In the next chapter I will go through the plan on a higher level.
Chapter 4
Methods
The purpose is to develop a proof of concept where the trustless feature of
the blockchain is carried over to the data sharing of an OMI-Node. In this
chapter I will go through all of the parts from the blockchain to the OMI-
Node and explain how the trustless feature is transferred from step to step.
I will also describe on a higher level what needs to be developed to achieve
this.
Bitcoin blockchain
The trustlessness starts from Bitcoin’s blockchain which is explained in more
detail in the Background chapter. To reiterate, the blockchain is a crypto-
graphically linked chain of blocks which forms a unforgeable public ledger.
The blocks contain transaction records on public addresses which hold the
actual value (bitcoins) and are controlled by users with their correspond-
ing private keys. Transactions can only be made with the private keys and
forgery is practically impossible. The network and the generation of new
linked blocks is handled by miners who compete on solving a cryptographi-
cally hard hash problem. The problem consists of finding a nonce, that when
hashed with the previous blocks hash, the next transactions and the nonce,
results in a predetermined amount of zeros in the resulting hash.
From the perspective of this thesis, what is needed from the Bitcoin
blockchain, is two Bitcoin addresses. One to be used to pay for the Block-
stack id in bitcoins and one to be used as the data address to hold Blockstack
specific transactions used in the virtualchain. The virtualchain uses a feature
called TX NULL DATA or OP RETURN in Bitcoins blockchain which
allows additional data to be stored in transactions. More detailed descrip-
tion of this can be found in the chapter Background. This links the trustless
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feature to Blockstack’s virtualchain.
Blockstack
Trustlessness feature is brought to Blockstack’s DNS by using the additional
data field (TX NULL DATA or OP RETURN) in Bitcoins blockchain
to store virtualchain operations codes and a zonefile hash. In this thesis the
Blockstack api will be used to register a unique id and to update the profile of
the id to hold a link to a json file with OMI-Node information. This file will
be signed with the blockstack api using the data key linked to the registered
id. This allows the storing of the file anywhere, as the signature can be used
to prove that the file was uploaded by the owner of the id. The file will have
the addresses and public keys of the OMI-Nodes, which will be used by the
OmiViewer to navigate to the OMI-Node and to verify signed messages.
OmiViewer and OMI-Node
A basic chrome extension will be developed that uses the browser action
popup to display a page which allows the user to search the Blockstack for
an registered id. The extension will then retrieve the zone file behind the id,
parse it for OMI-Node urls and public keys, and then display them for the
user. When a url is clicked it takes the user to the OMI-Node. Then when
a user makes a search that returns Omi xml data, a verify button can be
pressed, which checks the returned xml for a signed hash and verifies that it
has been signed with the private key corresponding to the public key that
was retrieved from Blockstack. The OMI-Node xml responses in the GUI
will be extended to include this signed hash of the objects.
Checking the signature of the signed hash of the OMI-Node message is the
last link in the trustless chain. The trustlessness is preserved cryptograph-
ically through the whole chain: starting from the Bitcoins blockchain, then
through Blockstack DNS to the signed json file with OMI-Node addresses
and public keys, and finally ending in the OMI-Node signed hashes of the
response messages.
In the next chapter I will go through the implementation in more detail.
Chapter 5
Implementation
In this chapter the actual implementation is presented in more detail.
Bitcoin blockchain
In my implementation I decided to use the default Bitcoin-core server pro-
vided by Blockstack developers. This is a additional part that needs to be
trusted, but it suffices for the purposes of this thesis. It would however be
possible to run the Bitcoin-core server ourselves as well, thus removing the
need to trust the server ran by Blockstack’s developers. The server address
used is bitcoin.blockstack.com.
The Bitcoin blockchain is mainly used in the background by the Block-
stack program, which is covered in the next chapter.
Blockstack
Blockstack was used to do the following operations: create a bitcoin wallet,
register a unique id, update the zonefile and to sign the linked json file used
with OmiViewer.
Creating a wallet
After setting up the Blockstack-core node and starting it with the command
blockstack-core –debug start a wallet is created automatically. The wallet
address can be queried with the command blockstack deposit which returned
the address 3G6RjfGAdTrCm7DKSfevFrmJwiczsq6Wfw. I used this address
to transfer bitcoins to the wallet. The bitcoins were bought using the Finnish
service Bittiraha.fi. Before starting the registration process the balance of
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the wallet should be checked to be sure that the funds have been transferred.
This was done with the command blockstack balance.
When the funds had been transferred, the registration process could be
started.
Registering a unique id in Blockstack
The registration process should be started by first checking the price of the
wanted id and if it is available. Availability could be easily checked by doing
a standard lookup with the command blockstack lookup <name>.id. The
price could be checked with the command blockstack price <name>.id. I
wanted to register a id that I could use in the future for other purposes also,
so I decided to register my nickname jukuli.id. The price command returned
a total estimate of 0.0026488 btc for this id.
After checking the availability and making sure that there is enough funds
in the wallet, the registration was done with the command blockstack register
<name>.id. This starts the registration and should return a success message
stating that the registration is pending. The whole registration process has a
couple of steps that are done in the background which needs a few blockchain
transactions. Because of this the registration process might take a few hours.
The progress can be monitored with the command blockstack info and when
it is complete, the registered id should show up with the command blockstack
names, which lists all the registered names.
The next step in the process was to update the zone file to have a link to
a json file storing the OMI-Node information.
Updating the zone file
After the id had been registered it could be viewed with the command block-
stack whois <name>.id and blockstack lookup <name>.id. The first one
returns technical information:
Listing 5.1: Whois: Technical information
{
” b l o ck p r eo rd e r ed a t ” : 461982 ,
” b lock renewed at ” : 461993 ,
” e xp i r e b l o c k ” : 567183 ,
” h a s z o n e f i l e ” : true ,
” l a s t t r a n s a c t i o n h e i g h t ” : 462004 ,
” l a s t t r a n s a c t i o n i d ” : ”
d2ea0bb984f350bae6c9a7a79f64ac0486243548de1c6080cb122b6536cec32b
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” ,
” owner address ” : ”37XbxF8QSn2PoMc8vuTng7kdu7JufAhcKW” ,
” owne r s c r i p t ” : ”
a914400900574786463f2665f9c1082465f5dd361da287 ” ,
” z o n e f i l e h a s h ” : ”
bed6805080598c496ee8b7cf359e75e27e4e9934 ”
}
The second one returns the profile and zone files:
Listing 5.2: Lookup: Profile and Zone files
{
” p r o f i l e ” : {
”@type” : ”Person ” ,
” account ” : [
{
” contentUr l ” : ” https : // d l . dropboxusercontent . com/ s /
g7h2zcwhmqsuo1o/omi nodes . j son ” ,
” i d e n t i f i e r ” : ” omi nodes ” ,
” s e r v i c e ” : ” omiviewer ”
}
] ,
” accounts ” : [ ] ,
” timestamp” : 1505912271.21517
} ,
” z o n e f i l e ” : ”$ORIGIN j u ku l i . id \n$TTL 3600\npubkey TXT
\”pubkey : data : 03
ee2916 f2c fb8d fa9c57a8 f8 f e00ca0 f4d5b648d310ab2c4 f f 2 f e e4c f 07253e95
\”\ n f i l e URI 10 1 \” f i l e : ///home/ j r a s i / . b l ock s tack /
storage−d i sk /mutable/ j u k u l i . id \”\ n https . t cp URI 10
1 \” https : // b locks tack . s3 . amazonaws . com/ j u ku l i . id
\”\ n http . t cp URI 10 1 \” http :// node . b l ocks tack . org
:6264/RPC2#juku l i . id \”\ n dht . udp URI 10 1 \”dht+udp
:// c83ac230b6d85d34d3171b855688f143c44f7f2d \”\n”
}
I decided to use the profile file to store the link to the json file, as changing
it only needs a mutable update which can be handled inside the Blockstack
virtualchain and does not need a costly blockchain transaction. The profile
file is a default functionality added to Blockstack to store personal informa-
tion about the user. By default it is stored in the Atlas network, but other
storage providers can be added, like Dropbox, in similar way as I added the
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omi nodes.json file, as can be seen in the next chapter.
The changes seen, in the file displayed before, were done by using the
command blockstack put profile <name>.id profile.json with the contents of
profile.json being what is displayed in 5.2.
The next step is to sign and store the omi nodes.json file linked in the
profile file.
Signing and storing the omi nodes.json file
The file used to store the OMI-Node addresses and public keys is to be
signed with a data private key linked with the registered id. This was done
using the command blockstack sign data <filename>. Running this to the
omi nodes.json file results in:
Listing 5.3: ominodes.json file
bsk2 .03
ee2916 f2c fb8d fa9c57a8 f8 f e00ca0 f4d5b648d310ab2c4 f f 2 f e e4c f 07253e95
. ZIo+hz8X/h3dTDbmVL2N9OS/m5eqrAC+
pNuTNpjCcLJOPGOQoi2fRVXaSecpNVzjRicAZYQl4kWyMKSNfO/
pjA==.277:”{\n\ t \” omi nodes \ ” : [ \ n\ t\ t {\” u r l \” :\” http
:// l o c a l h o s t :8080/ html/webc l i en t / index . html \” ,\n\ t\ t
\” pub l i c key \”:\”25X+V4A6uVqXM/
CQqKjQKikqvzYDA0Hd27dfXCDH4+s=\”\n\ t\ t }\n\ t ] ,\ n\ t \”
s i g n a t u r e u r l \” :\” https : // d l . dropboxusercontent . com/
s /9vdm66sdeqmc6ta/ omi nodes s i gnature . txt \”\n}\n” ,
Now this is saved to the omi nodes.json file and stored in the url displayed
in the profile file: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/g7h2zcwhmqsuo1o/omi nodes.json.
I decided to use Dropbox to store the file, but any file service could be used
(or multiple) as signing the file removes the need to trust the underlying
service.
After the omi nodes.json file with the OMI-Node links and public keys
were linked in the Blockstack profile I could start working on the OmiViewer.
OmiViewer and OMI-Node data signing
The OmiViewer is a simple chrome extension developed by me to handle
a couple of functions: to find the desired id from Blockstack DNS, to re-
trieve the omi nodes.json file and to verify the hashed and signed OMI-Node
response data using the retrieved public keys.
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Finding a user by id
When a user types an id in the search bar, the extension does a user lookup in
the Blockstack network. This can be done using the local api generated by the
Blockstack program, which by default can be found running in localhost:6270.
However, I had some problems with the local api, which halted my progress
significantly, so I decided to use the api provided by the Blockstack developers
in the url https://core.blockstack.org/. This adds another point that needs
to be trusted, but which can easily avoided in a full fletched implementation
by running the api ourselves.
The OmiViewer does the Blockstack user lookup in the background by
making a REST call to the address https://core.blockstack.org/v1/users/<userid>.
This returns the same profile and zone file information returned by the block-
stack program as in listing 5.2.
Parsing the user profile
The profile is parsed to find the link to the omi nodes.json file and then
this file as displayed in listing 5.3 is retrieved. The profile is also parsed for
pubkey:data which is the public data key and can be used to verify the data
that is signed and stored externally, like the omi nodes.json file. Next the
omi nodes.json file should be verified, but that turned out to be problematic.
I was not able to use the same libraries for signature verification as I used
later on with the OMI-Node data. After trying multiple different libraries I
had to skip this part, because of lack of development time. This adds yet
another part to trust in with this proof of concept implementation. I am
however quite certain that with more time a suitable library can be found to
verify the signature made by the Blockstack program.
After the supposed verification of the omi nodes.json file signature, the
file is parsed for OMI-Node urls and public keys, which are then displayed
to the user. Clicking a url takes the user to the OMI-Node’s web interface
and stores the public key for later signature verification.
OMI-Node data hashing and signing
The OMI-Node adds a signature of the hashed objects in the response xml
message. Every <result> tag has a <return> and a <msg> tag. The hash
and signature is calculated from the <Objects> tag that is inside the <msg>
tag and from everything inside it. The hash and signed hash is added to the
<return> tag as attributes objectsHashed and hashSigned.
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The used OMI-Node implementation is a modified version of the Aalto
OMI-Node [1]. Modifications were done to the OmiService.scala class in
the handleRequest function and in the OmiConfigExtension.scala class. The
OmiConfigExtension.scala was modified to add the loading of the private
and public keys from the config file to the config object. The handleRequest
class uses two new libraries to add the hashing and signing. Scrypto [10]
library is used for hashing and the nacl4s [9] library is used for signing. The
<Objects> tag and its contents are read as a string, which is then hashed
with a SHA-512 hash. This hash is then signed with the private key that
is stored in the OMI-Nodes config. The resulting signature and hash are
both then encoded with a Base64 encoding and stored to hashSigned and
objectsHashed attributes in the <return> tag.
Verifying signature in OmiViewer
After the OMI-Node has returned the response xml, the user can use OmiViewer
to verify that the signature is signed with a private key corresponding to the
public key retrieved through Blockstack. When the user clicks a verify but-
ton, OmiViewer scans the DOM tree for the response message. The signature
is then opened using the public key listed in the omi nodes.json file. This
is done using a javascript library called tweetnacl [11]. The <Objects> tag is
hashed and the resulting hash is compared to the hash retrieved from open-
ing the signature. If these two hashes are the same, the user knows that the
data is really signed by a key owned by the same person that was found from
Blockstack by the known id.
summary
By using cryptographic methods, the trustless feature is carried over from
Bitcoins blockchain all the way through Blockstack DNS and to finally to the
actual data shared by the OMI-Node. Computing power behind the Bitcoins
blockchain guarantees that there is no need to trust anything else but the
algorithms running the system. This feature is then brought to Blockstacks
DNS by cleverly using additional data in Bitcoin transactions, allowing a
virtualchain to run on top of it. Blockstack DNS is then used to register a
id and to store additional information behind that id, including information
about OMI-Node addresses and public keys. Finally the OMI-Node public
key is used to verify the data signed by the node and proving that it is really
published by the owner of the id originally found from Blockstack DNS.
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The next chapter evaluates the implementation and discusses some of the
problems encountered during development.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
The original goal of the thesis was to build a proof of concept implementation
where the Blockstack DNS is used to extend the trustless feature of Bitcoins
blockchain to the data shared by OMI-Nodes. The goal was partially achieved
and this chapter discusses what was successful, what failed and what were
the problems leading to the failure.
Partial success
The proof of concept was partially successful, although it had some parts
that could not be implemented as planned. I was able to successfully register
a unique id in Blockstack’s DNS and add additional information to the id
profile with the omi nodes.json file, that allowed me to link the id to the OMI-
Nodes. This additional information could also be found with the OmiViewer
chrome extension and shown to the user. I was also able to modify the
OMI-Node to add a signature of a hash of objects to the response xml. This
signature was also successfully verified with OmiViewer.
However there were a few parts that failed, adding the need for ad-
ditional trust for the system. Biggest one being the failure to verify the
omi nodes.json file that was signed by the Blockstack program with the id’s
private data key. This and other problems are discussed in the next section.
Failures and problems
The difficulties with the thesis can be separated to two categories: planning
and implementation.
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Planning
The first mistake I made was to underestimate the difficulty and overestimate
the amount of background material. The whole field of blockchains is quite
new and source materials are scattered and few. Collecting and writing
the background information took a lot longer than I first anticipated and
this cut time from the actual implementation. Blockchain information is
also changing in a fast pace and this made writing the background chapter
especially hard. I was constantly facing the dilemma of using more time to
rewrite sections or leaving old and incorrect information to the thesis. For
example the Segwit update to Bitcoin forced me to rewrite parts of the thesis.
These problems could have been at least partially avoided by starting the
thesis writing earlier, but it would have also increased the probability for in-
formation becoming old during the writing process. I could have also started
working on the implementation concurrently while writing the background
information. This might have expedited the writing process by making me
focus more on information directly related to the implementation.
Implementation
As stated in the previous section, writing the background chapter cut a lot of
time from the actual implementation. This in itself would have been enough
to cause problems, but there were also problems related to the technologies
used.
Blockstack is still in early development and this could be seen as missing
documentation and buggy software. I even ended up making a few minor
changes to the blockstack program to get some of the functionality working
correctly. This took away some of my own development time. The blockstack
program also went through frequent updates, which made changes to the api
that forced me to make changes to my own programs as well. In addition,
the updates forced me to use the developers own web service for querying
Blockstack from OmiViewer, as the local implementation stopped working
and I could not figure out why. This introduced the first extra step that
needed additional trust, that was not in the original thesis plan.
Finding working cryptographic libraries for the environments used in the
planned implementation also turned out be difficult. For example there were
multiple libraries that could be used with Scala and Javascript separately,
but finding ones that worked together was a lot more difficult. Most libraries
had a slightly different way of signing and verifying signatures, that resulted
in not being able to verify signatures in Javascript that were signed in Scala.
With more development time these differences could have been found and
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taken in to account, but instead I decided to find a library that worked in
both. I was able to find a library that worked for Scala and Javascript, but
I failed to find a library for Javascript that was able to verify the signature
done by the blockstack program for the omi nodes.json file. This resulted in
a second extra step that needed additional trust.
Most of the implementation related problems should be solved when the
Blockstack software and cryptographic libraries become more mature. With
more development time, I think they could have been mostly solved even
now. Currently the technology in the field changes so fast, that it is hard for
a single developer to keep up with the changes.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The proof of concept was only partially successful. However, I think the idea
behind is valid and could be implemented with more development time and
smarter technology decisions.
Extending the trustless feature of blockchains to other areas, is in my
opinion a development that will see a lot of progress in coming years. Inte-
grating the Blockstack DNS directly behind operating systems and browsers
will make it more compelling to casual users, allowing more diverse applica-
tion to be built on top of it.
Blockchains are quite new and the Blockstack distributed DNS is even
newer. Still there is a lot of potential and the technology is in a stage that
major innovation is already possible. At the moment it just requires a bit
more ”hands dirty” attitude, as standards and apis are constantly changing
and documentation is hard to come by.
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